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Abstract 
This article presents a critical account of Agamben’s understanding of the logic 
of sovereignty and of the notion bare life, particularly Agamben’s approach to the 
paradox of sovereignty and its relation to Aristotle’s metaphysical category of po-
tentiality. With regards to bare life, it brings together an analysis of the figure of 
the homo sacer with an account of Agamben’s use of paradigms as methodological 
tools. The first part of the paper argues that Agamben ontologises sovereignty by 
dramatising the paradox of its structure as im-potentiality. The second part claims 
that even though an account of Agamben’s methodology serves to respond to the 
different critiques that his notion of bare life has raised, Agamben’s notions of sov-
ereignty and of bare life ultimately rely on Schmitt’s decisionism. 
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Potencialidad, soberanía y nuda vida
Una lectura crítica de Giorgio Agamben
Resumen 
El artículo hace un recuento crítico de la forma en que Agamben entiende la 
lógica de la soberanía y la noción de nuda vida, particularmente su abordaje de 
la paradoja de la soberanía y su relación con la categoría metafísica aristotélica 
de la potencialidad. Con respecto a la nuda vida, combina el análisis de la figu-
ra del homo sacer con un recuento del uso que hace Agamben de los paradigmas 
como herramientas metodológicas. En la primera parte del ensayo, se argumenta 
que Agamben ontologiza la soberanía al dramatizar la paradoja de su estructura 
como im-potencialidad. En la segunda, se afirma que aunque la descripción de la 
metodología de Agamben sirve para responder a las diferentes críticas suscitadas 
por su noción de nuda vida, sus nociones de soberanía y de nuda vida dependen, en 
última instancia, del decisionismo de Schmitt.
Palabras clave: G. Agamben, nuda vida, biopolítica, soberanía.
Potencialidade, soberania e vida nua
Uma leitura crítica de Giorgio Agamben
Resumo
Este artigo apresenta a versão crítica do entendimento de Agamben sobre a lógica 
da soberania e da noção de vida nua. Em particular, a aproximação de Agamben 
para o paradoxo da soberania e da sua relação com a categoria metafísica da po-
tencialidade de Aristóteles. No que diz respeito à vida nua, reúne uma análise da 
figura do  homo sacer  com uma explicação do uso de Agamben de paradigmas 
como ferramentas metodológicas. Na primeira parte deste artigo, argumenta-se 
que Agamben ontologiza a soberaniadramatizando o paradoxo de sua estrutura 
como im-potencialidade. Na segunda parte, será alegado que, apesar de uma expli-
cação da metodologia de Agamben ter servido para responder às diferentes críticas 
que sua noção de vida nua tenha levantado, em última análise, duas noções da 
soberania e vida nua de Agamben dependem do “decisionismo schmittiano”.
Palavras-chave: G. Agamben, vida nua, biopolítica, soberania.
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Agamben opens a provocative line of research that provides in-
sightful links connecting the politisation of death and the biopolitical 
activity of the sovereign power by focusing on the correlation be-
tween modernity and sovereignty. However, it will be argued that in 
the cause of taking to the extreme this correlation through an exces- 
sive dramatisation of the paradox of sovereignty, Agamben entrenches 
himself in an ontological position that, while achieving its intention 
of criticising sovereignty as a whole, ends up in naturalising it as an 
omnipresent figure that produces the camp as an inescapable zone of 
indistinction.1
The first section of this article presents an account of Agamben’s 
theory of the state of the exception and the structure of sovereignty, 
in order to subsequently call into question Agamben’s invocation of 
Aristotle’s metaphysics in his analysis of constituting and constituted 
power. Here, my central argument is that, in Agamben, the de-cen-
tering of sovereignty is only achieved through its ontologisation as 
im-potentiality,2 that is to say, Agamben takes one step away from 
Schmitt (and only one) at the expense of constructing sovereignty as 
an omnipresent figure. Instead, I suggest that the retreat of sovereign-
ty corresponds to the dislocation of the state of exception and of the 
law as the privileged categories that inform the political production 
of bare life. 
Section two is devoted to Agamben’s notion of bare life and his 
treatment of the figure of the homo sacer as a paradigm that attempts 
to make intelligible a broader historical-problematic context (cf . 2009 
9). After an analysis of the notion of bare life (in terms of Agamben’s 
reading of Benjamin) and of the figure of the homo sacer, I present a 
recapitulation of Agamben’s use of paradigms as methodological in-
struments. With this in mind, I consider two critical remarks that the 
figure of the homo sacer has raised. Firstly, the critiques that revolve 
around the homo sacer as a figure that captures only one of the possi-
bilities of being “outside” the law, and secondly, the problematisation 
1 This is also one of the conclusions of Jacques Rancière who claims that for Agamben, 
“Any kind of claim to rights or any struggle enacting rights is [thus] trapped from the 
very outset in the mere polarity of bare life and the state of exception” (2004 301). 
2 To be precise, the ontologisation of sovereignty will be understood as the process 
through which Agamben assigns to the structure of the sovereign ban the notion of 
potentiality, which is, in turn, connected to a particular reading of Heidegger and 
an account of language. This move, however, should be located within Agamben’s 
search for the ontological foundation of Western politics. In this sense, in Agamben, 
the ontologisation of sovereignty is not the ontologisation of the political but rather 
it is the return to sovereignty after a politisation of ontology has been displayed. 
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of the concept of bare life as referring interchangeably to two different 
figures, to zoēas, simply the biological life of human beings, and to the 
figure of the homo sacer, as he who may be killed but not sacrificed.
To conclude this part, I argue that an account of Agamben’s 
methodology provides a ground to respond these critiques. However, 
given Agamben’s insistence on Schmitt’s decisionism (2004), I suggest, 
as a conclusion of this enquiry, that a double movement is necessary: 
to rethink the decentering of sovereignty as the determinant political 
category, not via the dramatisation of the paradox of sovereignty but 
via its de-ontologisation. And secondly, to reconstruct the notion of 
bare life by deactivating the residues of Schmitt’s decisionism within 
Agamben’s framework.
The Paradox of Sovereignty and Potentiality 
Antonio Negri traces the concept of sovereignty through that of 
a crisis, discussing the necessity to “escape the fetish of sovereignty as 
the concept of government in modernity” (2010 209). After locating 
different perspectives within postmodern thought that sustain this 
crisis (from the biopolitical transformation of the concept of sovereign- 
ty to its modification in the light of international law), Negri poses a 
cardinal question for this enquiry:
If, in the current post-modern climate, the principle of sovereignty 
is dissolving, could it however be rebuilt –stripped of every spurious 
characteristic– abstracted into an unambiguous definition of “excep-
tionality”? … This is what some legal-philosophical positions rather 
ambiguously –and very abstractly– propose, sometimes claiming that 
the strength of the exception restores the entire process of the produc-
tion of law under the auspices of sovereignty, at others recognising in the 
emergence of the exception a new figure of sovereign command …. But 
it is a process so abstract (and teleological or –as Kant put it– terroristic, 
that is, armed with a radical ethical pessimism, based on a metaphysics 
of transcendence) as to become instrumental in too many theoretical 
positions and indifferent to too many ideological standpoints. When a 
key opens too many doors it can only be a lock-pick. (2010 208)
Giorgio Agamben’s critique of sovereignty represents precisely a 
threshold in the totalisation of sovereignty through a re-composition 
of its abandonment in the category of the exception. Indeed, following 
Schmitt, Agamben claims that sovereign power is undoubtedly situat-
ed within and above the law (cf . 1998 15), coinciding with different 
thinkers from a wide range of intellectual traditions –e .g . Rousseau, 
Derrida, Deleuze, Kafka– by affirming that there is a fundamental 
paradox at the core of sovereignty (cf . Connolly 2007 24), which con-
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sist in the fact that the sovereign is outside and inside the juridical 
order (cf . Agamben 1998 15). Unlike Rousseau, who, in On the Social 
Contract, comprehended the paradox of sovereignty3 to thenceforth 
negotiate its terms and resolve it through the figure of the wise le-
gislator4 and the appeal for a unified nation, Agamben’s reading of 
sovereignty discloses deeper paradoxes that could only be resolved 
by rejecting or transcending its logic altogether, a task that becomes 
unachievable once the paradox of sovereignty is taken to a point at 
which it is no longer possible to tell apart modernity and sovereignty. 
For Agamben, and certainly for Schmitt, this paradox lies in the 
fact that the sovereign, having the legal power to decide if the jurid-
ical order is to be suspended, legally places himself outside the law. 
Consequently, the limits of the juridical order are subjected to the 
structure of this paradox, whose topology corresponds to the struc-
ture of the exception (cf . Agamben 1998 15). In a well-known passage 
from Political Theology (2005), quoted by Agamben in Homo Sacer, 
Schmitt writes: 
The exception appears in its absolute form when it is a question of 
creating a situation in which juridical rules can be valid .... There is no 
rule applicable to chaos … –and therefore– a regular situation must be 
created and the sovereign is he who definitely decides if this situation is 
actually effective … [h]e has the monopoly over the final decision. (19)
Thus, the exception –which for Agamben becomes more impor-
tant than the regular situation–, is explained by the fact that a final 
authority is required to suspend the validity of the positive law, to 
define “the normal case as the realm of its own validity” (1998 16). 
This final authority is insufficiently informed by any law that precedes 
it: “Authority proves itself not to need law to create law” (Schmitt 19).
3 For Rousseau the Paradox of Sovereignty resides in the fact that “In order for an 
emerging people to appreciate the healthy maxims of politics and follow the funda-
mental rules of statecraft, the effect would have to become the cause: the social spirit 
which should be the result of the institution, would have to preside over the founding 
of the institution itself; and men would have to be prior to the laws what they ought 
to become by means of laws” (2004 27).
4 Here it is worth quoting Rousseau’s comments on the figure of the legislator in full: 
“He who dares to undertake the making of a people’s institutions ought to feel him-
self capable, so to speak, of changing human nature, of transforming each individual, 
who is by himself a complete and solitary whole, into part of a greater whole from 
which he in a manner receives his life and being; of altering man’s constitution for 
the purpose of strengthening it; and of substituting a partial and moral existence for 
the physical and independent existence nature has conferred on us all. He must, in a 
word, take away from man his own resources and give him instead new ones alien to 
him, and incapable of being made use of without the help of other men” (2004 25).
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The character of the exception is defined by Agamben as an ex-
clusion, which preserves a relation with the general rule as a form 
of the rule’s suspension. In this sense, the rule applies in no longer 
applying and, therefore, the state of exception, far from being the 
chaotic situation that precedes the order, is the scenario that results 
from its suspension (cf . Agamben 1998). It is in this light that we must 
read Carl Schmitt’s statement that “sovereignty presents itself in the 
form of a decision on the exception” (qtd. in Agamben 1998 26). 
The complexity of the inclusion described by Agamben exceeds 
not only Deleuze’s and Guattari’s affirmation of the capacity of sov-
ereignty to rule only over what it is capable of interiorizing (cf . 1987 
45) but also Blanchot’s claim that there is an attempt of society to con-
fine the outside and constitute it in an “interiority of expectation or of 
exception” (1993 272). Indeed, Agamben goes further to suggest that 
the exception that defines the structure of sovereignty is even more 
complex: “what is outside is included not simply by means of an inter-
diction or an interment, but rather by means of the suspension of the 
juridical order’s validity” (1998 18). In this particular sense, the situa-
tion created in the exception cannot be defined either as a situation of 
fact or as a situation of right, but rather as a situation of threshold of 
indistinction between the two. This zone of indistinction is produced 
according to Agamben by the inclusion of chaos in the juridical order, 
since in order to refer to something, a rule must both presuppose and 
yet still establish a relation with what is outside relation. Once this 
presuppositional character of law is fully established and the sovereign 
power is located in the very indistinction between outside and inside, 
the state of exception and the state of nature become the two sides of 
the very same topological process in which, according to Agamben, 
as in a Möbius strip, “what was presupposed as external –the state of 
nature– now reappearsin the inside –the state of exception–” (1998 37). 
It is in this way that Agamben digs into the paradox of sovereign-
ty to reveal its originary structure, anticipating one of his major and 
problematic conclusions: sovereignty is the space in which “law refers 
to life and includes it in itself by suspending it” (1998 28). At this point, 
the eschatological character of Agamben’s notion of sovereignty is re-
vealed, completely capturing life in the tight logic of the paradox. A 
theoretical invocation by Agamben reinforces and fills this eschatolog- 
ical position: Agamben’s turn to Aristotle’s metaphysical concepts of 
potentiality and actuality5 in his treatment of the form of law and the 
dialectic of constituting and constituted power. 
5 Agamben, in an essay entitled On Potentiality, discusses Aristotle’s conceptions of 
potentiality and actuality. For Aristotle, there are two forms of potentiality, a generic 
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In her analysis of the French Revolution, Hannah Arendt, to whom 
Agamben devotes just a few lines in his treatment of constituting 
power (cf . 1998 41), shows how the theoretical problem to be resolved 
is not that of the conception of a constituting power that does not dis-
solve itself in a constituted power (Arendt 1963 185), but rather, that the 
first theoretical task should be the establishment of a clear differentia-
tion between them. By not having fulfilled this task, the revolutionary 
tradition has failed to recognise the interconnection of constitut-
ing power with constituted power. Unlike Agamben, who agrees 
with Arendt on the importance of this differentiation (cf . 1998 43), 
Antonio Negri focuses on the democratic revolutions in terms of the 
power struggles between constituent and constituted power, from a 
historical-political level, that is to say, on how “initially, constituent 
power infuses its dynamism into the constitutional system and then 
is itself reformed by the constitution” (Negri 1999 7). In this sense, 
constituent power for Negri “takes the form of a permanent revolu-
tion, a process in which the subject’s independence is affirmed at the 
moment when it continually rolls back the enemy’s oppression and 
simultaneously expresses, accumulates, and organises its own power” 
(1999 31). Therefore, what is at stake for Negri is a political question 
concerning democracy, since his analysis of constituent power focus-
es on its mobilisation in particular events where its democratic will 
is founded. When conceived in all its radicality, constituting power 
“ceases to be a strictly political concept and necessarily presents itself 
as category of ontology” (Agamben 1998 44). However, Negri never 
leaves aside the political dimension of the conflict between constitu- 
ting and constituted power. Agamben, who discusses Negri’s fra-
mework briefly (cf . id . 43), claims that while his thesis on the isolation 
of constituting power from sovereign power fails to grasp the origi-
nary ban structure of sovereignty, Negri’s suggestion regarding the 
ontological character of constituting power as a problem of the cons-
titution of potentiality “opens the way for a new articulation of the 
relation between potentiality and actuality” (id . 44). 
Ultimately, however, Agamben turns away from Negri’s and even 
Arendt’s frameworks, adopting instead the Aristotelian distinction 
between potentiality and actuality. The only justification Agamben 
provides for this invocation of Aristotle’s metaphysics is that the 
one, in which an alteration or transformation has to take place for the potentiality to 
turn into actuality (i .e . the potentiality of a child to become architect) and an existing 
one, in which potentiality is already there and therefore whoever has it can choose 
not to convert it into actuality (i .e . the potentiality of a composer to write music). It is 
precisely the latter form of potentiality that interests Agamben (cf . 1999 179).
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relation Aristotle establishes between potentiality and act is as com-
plicated as the relation between constituted and constituting power 
and, in the last analysis, “the relation between constituting and con-
stituted power (perhaps like every authentic understanding of the 
problem of sovereignty) depends on how one thinks the existence and 
autonomy of potentiality” (1998 44). 
The Aristotelian concept of potentiality is appealing for Agamben 
not because it precedes actuality while remaining subordinated to it, 
but rather because potentiality in Aristotle is also potentiality not to 
do or be, and, in this sense, potentiality “maintains itself in relation 
to actuality in the form of its suspension” (1998 45). This is why, for 
Agamben, in describing the nature of potentiality as im-potentiality 
Aristotle anticipates the paradigm of sovereignty, since the sovereign 
ban corresponds to the authentic structure of potentiality. Indeed, just 
as potentiality could suspend itself and through which it becomes two-
faced, the sovereign structure also becomes double, suspending itself 
while maintaining itself in relation to the ban, and, therefore, claiming 
that “constituting power never exhausts itself in constituted power is 
not enough, sovereign power can also, as such, maintain itself indef-
initely without ever passing over into actuality” (1998 47). Here it is 
worth asking a simple question: if the existing potentiality, that is, the 
potentiality not to do or be, is characterised by its own suspension so 
that whoever has it can choose not to turn it into actuality, –for in-
stance the potentiality of a poet to write poems–, then how to explain 
the fact that the potentiality that does not pass into actuality could be 
affected by time? Indeed, one can argue that the potentiality of a mu-
sician to play the piano, for instance, is weakened if for a long period 
it does not pass into act. For Agamben, however, potentiality in its two 
forms is that “through which Being founds itself sovereignly, which 
is to say, without anything preceding or determining it other than its 
own ability not to be” (id . 46). Therefore, the question that remains 
open is that of the relation between impotentiality and practice, which 
could be translated as a political question concerning the ability of 
the sovereign ban to capture life by suspending itself without passing 
into actuality. 
Agamben’s use of the notion of potentiality as a tool to determine 
the extent to which constituting and constituted power are mutually 
imbricated, disclosing a deeper paradox at the core of the sovereign 
ban constitutes, no doubt, a successful attempt to capture the structu-
re of the sovereign ban in its capacity to suspend itself. However, the 
Aristotelian concept of potentiality is not only essentially different 
from what Negri or Arendt meant by constituting and constituted 
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power at the historical level, but also it does not confine the political-
practical dimension of the debate.6
Central to Agamben’s approach to the dialectic between constitu-
ting and constituted power through the category of potentiality is his 
move from political philosophy to first philosophy, which is ultimate-
ly, what allows the reading of Agamben’s notion of sovereignty to be 
teleological. It is worth quoting Agamben in full on this point: 
The unresolved dialectic between constituting power and constitut- 
ed power opens the way for a new articulation of the relation between 
potentiality and actuality, which requires nothing less than a rethink-
ing of the ontological categories of modality in their totality. The 
problem is therefore moved from political philosophy to first philoso-
phy (or, if one likes, politics is returned to its ontological position). Only 
an entirely new conjunction of possibility and reality, contingency and 
necessity, and the other pathētouontos, will make it possible to cut the 
knot that binds sovereignty to constituting power. And only if it is pos-
sible to think the relation between potentiality and actuality differently 
–and even to think beyond this relation– will it be possible to think a 
constituting power wholly released from the sovereign ban. Until a new 
and coherent ontology of potentiality (beyond the steps that have been 
made in this direction by Spinoza, Schelling, Nietzsche, and Heidegger) 
has replaced the ontology founded on the primacy of actuality and its 
relation to potentiality, a political theory freed from the aporias of sov-
ereignty remains unthinkable. (1998 44)
In Potentialities (1999), Agamben clearly connects the idea of po-
tentiality with a particular conception of ontology. Indeed, in this 
essay, Agamben claims that every human power is im-potentiality 
and, paradoxically, “every human potentiality is always-already held 
in relation to its own privation” (182). The remark of “human poten-
tiality” comes from Agamben’s belief that other living beings are 
capable only of their “specific potentiality. But human beings are the 
animals who are capable of their own impotentiality. The greatness of 
human potentiality is measured by the abyss of human impotentiali-
ty” (ibd .). At this point, Agamben’s reading of Heidegger comes to the 
6 On the differences between Agamben’s and Arendt’s reading of constituted and con-
stituting power, Jennings (2011) claims that Arendt’s framework contrasts with “the 
political anthropology implicit in political modernity (including the revolutionary 
tradition up to Benjamin and Agamben) in which the very notion of a distinction 
between constituent and constituting power in constitutional theory still to this day 
necessarily implies pre-constituted people (i .e . the state of nature) choosing to form 
a political community outside of any pre-existing association of relationship to his-
tory” (2011 141).
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fore, so that the thinking of Being is always the thinking of the poten-
tiality of Being, and potentiality has always primacy over actuality (cf . 
Dreyfus 1991). Agamben’s ontology in the realm of sovereignty and 
potentiality is therefore tied to this particular conception of Being. 
This is also evident in Language and Death, where Agamben en-
gages with the analysis of Heidegger’s notion of death, making an 
ontological choice: Being is given. However, this ontological choice 
is marked by the problematisation of the Aristotelian definition of 
the human being as an “animal that speaks” and the fundamental 
negativity of language that this definition implies.7 Language is, for 
Agamben, the crucial element for his ontological perspective. He 
claims that for the metaphysical tradition, the limit of language has 
been thought as a presupposition of a relation between a negative 
transcendent foundation and what can be said (cf . 2006). Therefore, 
Agamben’s ontology is an attempt that, while retaining Heidegger’s 
notion of Being, proposes to rethink the negativity of language claim-
ing that “the unthought or non-being is not to be consigned to a lack, 
an ineffability, or as the arch-presupposition of a negative definition 
of being, but instead as its very affirmative and exposed condition of 
possibility” (Zartaloudis 250). This ontological position is ambivalent: 
on the one hand, it dwells on the negativity of language as a terrifying 
and predestining confrontation with death and, on the other, it pres-
ents an idea of redemption. 
At this point, we can go back to Agamben’s definition of structure 
of the exception and the category of potentiality immersed in this on-
tological position to see how this tension is resolved in Homo Sacer in 
favor of a totalising conception of sovereignty, despite Agamben’s ap-
peal for a politics freed from every ban. Certainly, taking into account 
that the relation of the exception is a relation of ban (cf . 1998 28) and 
that under the state of exception, Being is “nothing other than Being 
in the ban of being” (id . 60), the state of death permeates all structures 
of power, making it impossible to act outside the zone of indistinction. 
To move from the political dimension of constituting and constituted 
power to an ontology of potentiality is to take the paradox of sover-
eignty to the extreme in which sovereignty itself becomes the pure 
potentiality of Being to suspend itself in a relation of ban, where at the 
limit, “pure potentiality and pure actuality are indistinguishable, and 
the sovereign is precisely this zone of indistinction” (1998 47). 
7 An insightful book in which this connection between ontology, metaphysics and lan-
guage is traced from Agamben’s earlier works is: Giorgio Agamben: Power, Law and 
the Uses of Criticism (2010) by Thanos Zartaloudis.
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It is in this sense that Agamben’s definition of sovereignty renders 
meaningless any attempt to dissociate democracy from totalitarian-
ism8 (cf . Agamben 2004), which constitutes not a historiographical 
claim, but rather a historical-philosophical one, according to which, 
ultimately, democracy does not break the link between violence 
and law. In order to break this link and thus to render the excep-
tion inoperative, Agamben relies on the ambiguous expectation of 
a new ontology of potentiality, pointing in a theological direction. 
Furthermore, Agamben’s invocation of potentiality tied to a particu-
lar ontological decision exacerbates the paradox of sovereignty to a 
point at which the whole biopolitical production necessarily passes 
through the exceptionality of sovereignty. 
However, the parallel that Agamben draws between the struc-
ture of the ban and that of the Aristotelian potentiality could also be 
conceived in a certain sense as a step away from Schmitt, since the 
state of exception becomes already immersed in every process (ju-
ridical or not) where empty forms of relations produce the zone of 
indistinguishability between life and law (cf . 1998 59). In other words, 
sovereignty becomes omnipresent through its own suspension so 
that it is no longer a juridical-technical dispositif, but rather becomes 
a grey zone of impotentiality. Here, Walter Benjamin comes to the 
fore once again, so that the state of exception becomes the rule due 
to an intensification of its own undecidability, which also means that 
“the state of exception is no longer able to fulfill the function Schmitt 
assigned to it in Political Theology: to define the normal situation. 
The state of exception is not meant to produce or confirm the rule –it 
tends, rather, to coincide with it, that is to say, to blur it” (Agamben 
2005b 293). This partial reading of Agamben –without the Schmittian 
ghost of decisionism–, would not clash with an understanding of the 
way in which the biopolitical transformation of sovereignty has dis-
placed both, the juridical exception and the law giving more relevance 
to the norm. However, as it has been shown, this de-centering of sov-
ereignty is only achieved through its ontologisation as impotentiality, 
in which, by suspended itself, it permeates every relation of power. 
That is to say, the dislocation of sovereignty in Agamben is the result 
of the dramatisation of the paradox of sovereignty by which the fig-
ure of the Leviathan is re-established in a structure of exception that 
exceeds the juridical order, rather than being the affirmation of the 
8 As Rancière has pointed out, for Agamben, “any difference grows faint between de-
mocracy and totalitarianism and any political practice proves to be already ensnared 
in the biopolitical trap” (301).
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dislocation of the state of exception and of the law as the privileged 
categories that inform the political production of bare life.
In other words, through the invocation of Aristotle’s metaphys-
ical concept of im-potentiality Agamben places himself between 
Schmitt and Benjamin, displacing sovereignty from the strictly ju-
ridical exception but nonetheless retaining it within the structure 
of sovereign ban as a totalising structure that “captures and incor-
porates Benjamin’s conception of a pure violence that exists outside 
the law”(2005 299). It remains, therefore, an open question to be an-
swered and with which to conclude this section: how to rethink the 
dislocation of sovereignty as a political category without falling into a 
totalising conception of sovereign power?
Violence and Bare Life
Agamben’s investigation of sovereignty as the sphere in which 
“law refers to life and includes it in itself by suspending it” (1998 28)9 
opens up his inquiry into bare life. The passage from Agamben’s analy-
sis of the structure of the paradox of sovereignty to his study of the 
homo sacer pivots on Agamben’s interpretation of Walter Benjamin’s 
essay Critique of Violence. In this essay, Benjamin denounces the 
tight link between law and violence –violence is the origin of law– 
and therefore for him, justice and law reveal their unrelated nature. 
Indeed, as Benjamin had mentioned before in The Right to Use Force 
“the law’s concern with justice is only apparent, whereas in truth the 
law is concerned with self-preservation” (2002 232). Law, rather than 
guaranteeing justice preserves and posits itself in acts and represen-
tations of violence, either in the use of violence as means to legal ends 
–law preserving violence– or in the violence outside law which creates 
law –law making violence– (cf . Benjamin 2002 242).
Here, we are in the terrain of mythic violence, since according to 
Benjamin, at the origin of the cycle of lawmaking and law preserv-
ing violence, lay violence as a manifestation of the gods, and thus, 
law was “merely a residue of the demonic stage of human existence, 
when legal statutes determined not only men’s relationships but also 
their relation to the gods” (1920 243). In order to break this cycle, and 
therefore to dissolve the irreducible link between law and violence, 
Benjamin confronted Mythic violence with the problematic notion of 
divine violence:
9 According to Agamben, “the sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted 
to kill without committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice, and sacred 
life –that is, life that may be killed but not sacrificed– is the life that has been captured 
in this sphere” (1998 83).
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If mythic violence is lawmaking, divine violence is law destroying; 
if the former sets boundaries, the latter is boundlessly destroys them; 
if mythic violence brings at once guilt and retribution, divine violence 
only expiates; if the former threatens, the later strikes; if the former is 
bloody, the later is lethal without spilling blood. (1920 297)
We cannot fully interrogate this messianic notion here but in re-
lation to Agamben’s argument it is important to highlight that divine 
violence deposes the law, providing a parallel to sovereign violence. 
Although Agamben recognizes the ambiguity of divine violence, he 
claims nonetheless that its definition becomes clearer when it is ana-
lyzed through the state of exception (cf . 1998 67). Indeed, the violence 
exercised in the state of exception, he writes, “clearly neither preserves 
nor simply posits law, but rather conserves it in suspending it and 
posits it in excepting itself from it” (ibd .) and in this sense, sovereign 
violence like divine violence cannot be reduced to lawmaking or law-
preserving violence. Both, divine violence and Agamben’s call for a 
new ontology of potentiality point in the messianic direction in which 
the link between law and violence would be broken. For Benjamin, 
the bearer of the link between violence and law is “bare life” (id . 65), 
hence he writes “mythic violence is bloody power over bare life for 
its own sake” (1920 250). This is why, for Benjamin, “it is worthwhile 
to investigate the origin of the dogma of the sacredness of life” (1920 
202). It is precisely by following this invitation that Agamben starts 
his genealogical inquiry into bare life and sacred life.
Agamben begins by asserting that the Greeks “did not even pos-
sess a term to express the complex semantic sphere that we indicate 
with the single term life” (1998 66), instead they used two different 
terms to refer to life: zoē, as the simply natural life common to all 
beings(animal, gods and men) and bios “which indicated the form of 
way of living proper to an individual or a group” (1998 1). This dis-
tinction represents, for Agamben, a decisive point in the origin of 
Western politics (cf . id . 66). Most importantly, however, according to 
Agamben, for the Greeks this distinction does not assign a sense of 
sacredness to life itself. Indeed, “even in those societies that, like clas-
sical Greece, celebrate animal sacrifices and occasionally immolated 
human victims, life in itself was not considered sacred” (ibd .). 
It is later, with the introduction of Roman law, that the character 
of sacredness is tied to the notion of human life (cf . Agamben 1998 
71). Homo sacer –he who may be killed but not sacrificed– appears for 
Agamben as a figure that is indissolubly linked to sovereignty, since 
sovereignty is “the sphere in which it is permitted to kill without com-
mitting homicide and without celebrating sacrifice”(id . 83). The homo 
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sacer is included in the political realm in his capacity to be killed, he 
belongs to God in the form of unsacrificeability: “Life that cannot be 
sacrificed and yet may be killed is sacred life” (id . 82). In this sense, 
what defines the status of the homo sacer is the “the double exclusion 
into which he is taken and the violence to which he finds himself ex-
posed” (ibd .). 
As William Connolly has argued, Agamben’s conception of the 
sacred as a twofold structure –double exclusion– differs from con-
ventional approaches to this notion. Indeed, Agamben’s notion of the 
sacred is defined by the violence that opens a sphere that is neither 
the sphere of the profane nor that of the divine. Hence, sacred life can 
be killed but not murdered (Bartonek 2004), constituting an inherent 
principle in the formulation of sacred life itself and also in the struc-
ture of sovereign power: 
In the figure of this sacred life, something like a bare life makes 
its appearance in the Western world. What is decisive, however, is that 
from the very beginning this sacred life has an eminently political cha-
racter and exhibits an essential link with the terrain on which sovereign 
power is founded. (Agamben 1998 100)
Central to the double exclusion of the sacred is Agamben’s invo-
cation of the ban as the original political relation. Agamben quoting 
Cavalca, states that to ban someone is “to say that anybody may harm 
him” (1998 104). The ban, however, is not simply a sanction, rather 
it entails abandonment. Heidegger who is in the background of 
Agamben’s treatment of the ban, confronts the problem of the aban-
donment of the entity by Being, revealing that Being is nothing other 
than the “being’s being abandoned and remitted to itself” (Agamben 
59). The relation of the ban becomes, for Agamben, a relation in which 
the being is abandoned by a law “that prescribes nothing and not even 
itself” (1998 60). The life caught in the sovereign sphere is the life that 
has been abandoned in the juridical paradox of sovereignty, the sacred 
life that may be killed but not sacrificed;10 it is in this particular sense 
that the production of bare life appears in Agamben as the “origi- 
nary activity of sovereignty” (id . 83). 
However, homo sacer is a figure treated by Agamben as a paradigm 
whose role is to “constitute and make intelligible a broader historical 
problem” (2009 9). That is to say, even though the homo sacer consti- 
10 The threshold figure that embodies the sacred man, for Agamben, is the werewolf. It 
is the man banned by his community. The Werewolf, by definition has not collective 
identity and it is completely defenseless: “it is a threshold of indistinction and of pas-
sage between animal and man, between physis andnomos, exclusion and inclusion” 
(1998 105).
[ 93]Potentiality, Sovereignty and Bare Life. A critical reading...
ideas y valores · vol. lxiii · n.o 156 • diciembre 2014 • issn 0120-0062 (impreso) 2011-3668 (en línea) • bogotá, colombia • pp. 79 - 99
tutes an actual historical phenomenon, Agamben uses this figure 
not as a signifier extended to or imposed on historical contexts by 
means of metaphorical transfer of meaning, but rather as paradigm 
that corresponds to the analogous logic of the example. In the first 
essay of The Signature of all Things (cf . 2009 9-32), Agamben reflects 
on the function and meaning of paradigms responding indirectly to 
the different critiques that have been raised regarding the notion of 
homo sacer as a merely historiographical reconstruction. In this es-
say, Agamben first traces the concept of paradigm in Foucault’s work, 
indicating its relation to Kuhn’s notion of scientific paradigms,11 to 
subsequently establish a more general genealogy of this concept that 
leads him back to Aristotle’s Prior Analytics. This insightful investi-
gation cannot be fully revised here, but for the sake of my argument 
it is worth quoting a passage that summarises the basic features of a 
paradigm: 
1. A paradigm is a form of knowledge that is neither inductive nor 
deductive but analogical. It moves from singularity to singularity. 2. By 
neutralising the dichotomy between the general rule and the particular, 
it replaces a dichotomous logic with a bipolar analogical model. 3. The 
paradigmatic case becomes such by suspending and, at the same time, 
exposing its belonging to the group, so that it is never possible to sepa-
rate its exemplarity from its singularity. 4. The paradigmatic group is 
never presupposed by the paradigms; rather, it is immanent in them. 
5. In the paradigm, there is no origin or archê; every phenomenon is 
the orirgin, every image isarchaic. 6. The historicity of the paradigm 
lies neither in diachronic not in synchrony but in a crossing of the two. 
(Agamben 1999 31)
With this in mind, two different critiques to Agamben’s notion 
of bare life, as embodied by the figure of the homo sacer could be 
considered. The first one asserts that Agamben has hypostatised the 
homo sacer as the only figure outside the law produced in the double 
exclusion to which the sacred is exposed. There is no room, according 
to this critique, to think the antagonistic social practices articulated 
within those who are banned from the juridical-political community 
and, therefore, the political in Agamben appears as an unidirectional 
11 For Agamben, Foucault’s and Kuhn’s notion of paradigm are analogous. This rela-
tion is established when taking into account Kuhn’s second meaning of paradigm, 
that is to say, paradigm not as a disciplinary matrix but rather as an example, as “a 
single case that by its repeatability acquires the capacity to model tacitly the behavior 
and research practices of scientists. The empire of rule, understood as the canon of 
scientificity, is thus replaced by that of the paradigm; the universal logic of the law is 
replaced by the specific and singular logic of the example” (Agamben 1999 11-12).
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relation of exclusion. Bare life is, in this sense, an artificial product, an 
obscure bareness that hides social relations of resistance and politi-
cal articulations and that only serves to “personalise what is excluded 
from the protection of law” (Vismann 2001 15) without capturing all 
the possibilities that being outside the law could report. The homo sac-
er is, therefore, incapable of using violence in his defense. Agamben’s 
reading of the dialectic of mythic violence does not allow an interpre-
tation of law-making violence as the violence used for natural ends, 
so that the violence outside the law is, paradoxically the violence exer-
cised by law in the state of exception. On the contrary, despite the 
fact that Benjamin “recognises the inherent law-making character of 
violence used for natural ends, he nevertheless believes that this vio-
lence originates as a violence outside of law” (Magnuson 2008 75). To 
sum up, as Laclau suggests, in order to reduce all the possibilities of 
the ban to the figure of the homo sacer, extra presuppositions should 
be added to Agamben’s argument:
In the first place, the sheer separateness –absence of relation– of 
the outside involves that he/she is a naked individuality, dispossessed 
of any kind of collective identity. But secondly, it also involves that the 
situation of the outsider is one of radical indefension, wholly exposed 
to the violence of those inside the city. Only at that prince can sover-
eign power be absolute. Are, however, these two extra presuppositions 
justified? Do they logically emerged from the mere category of “being 
outside the law”? Obviously not. (Laclau 2007 14)
Needless to say that all of these critiques that revolve around the 
figure of the homo sacer as a reduction of the different possibilities 
opened up by the sovereign ban miss the fact that the homo sacer is 
treated by Agamben as a paradigm, and in this sense, the homo sacer 
is only a “singular case that is isolated from its context only insofar 
as, by exhibiting its own singularity, it makes intelligible a new en-
semble, whose homogeneity it itself constitutes” (Agamben 1999 18). 
In other words, Laclau takes the figure of the homo sacer as a fixed 
structure whose singularity is to be transferred to different historical 
phenomena without suspending its own particularity, or as Agamben 
has put it, without deactivating its “normal use” (ibd .). Laclau and the 
aforementioned scholars are certainly right when they suggest that 
the homo sacer is only one of the possibilities opened up by the rela-
tion of the ban, and that in concrete historical contexts, the outsider 
will probably have social and identity links. However, Agamben’s in-
tention when using the figure of the homo sacer is to present a canon 
detached from its singularity and in this sense, he is moving away 
from deduction and induction.
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There is a second group of critiques to the notion of bare life that 
also ignore Agamben’s methodological framework. Indeed, the notion 
of bare life, according to these critiques, is marked by an irresolvable 
ambivalence; it is the life of the homo sacer and yet, in Agamben’s 
analysis of modern democracy, it is tied to the secularised notion of 
naked life. The status of the homo sacer is defined by the double exclu-
sion to which it is exposed and as such, it overflows the pure biological 
life of the “modern avatars” to which Agamben refers as examples of 
bare life (cf . 1998 120). In Means without Ends Agamben claims that 
biological life which is the 
… secularised form of naked life and which shares its unuttera-
bility and impenetrability, constitutes the real forms of life literally as 
forms of survival: biological life remains inviolate in such forms as that 
obscure threat that can suddenly actualize itself in violence, inextra-
neousness, in illness, in accidents. (2000 8)
Zoē then, according to these critiques, becomes a pivotal notion 
that reappears in Agamben analysis of the politisation of life during 
the 20th century, entering into conflict with the centrality of the sa-
cred in the notion of bare life. Indeed, when analysing the bare life of 
a patient –Karen Quinlan– Agamben makes clear that it is zoē rather 
than the notion of the sacred which becomes determinant in the no-
tion of bare life as such: 
Here biological life –which the machines are keeping functional by 
artificial respiration, pumping blood into the arteries, and regulating 
the blood temperature– has been entirely separated from the form of 
life that bore the name Karen Quinlan: here life becomes (or at least 
seems to become) pure zoē. (1998 186)
In other words, Agamben is accused of relating bare life to two 
different historical situations at the same time and yet, being inca-
pable of examining the particularity of the forms of life deprived of 
value. The politisation of life is, therefore, reduced to the sovereign 
production of the sacred man, who, in turn, is partially secularised 
in the figures of the overcomatose, the neomort and the modern 
avatars (cf . 1998 164). This is, for instance, the position defended by 
Thomas Lemke, for whom Agamben “cannot account for these pro-
cesses since his attention is fixed on the establishment of a border 
–a border that he does not comprehend as a staggered zone but as 
a line without extension that reduces the question to an either-or” 
(2011 59). Furthermore, since it is tied to a notion of the sacred linked 
to sovereign violence (cf . Norris 2000), the notion of bare life does 
not inform either the economisation of life –the processes by which 
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life is deprived of value through the commoditisation of the body– or 
the proliferation of molecular focuses of production of forms of life 
deprived of value outside the sovereign domain. To sum up, as Paul 
Patton has put it, Agamben’s argument on bare life –as zoē and sacred 
life– “relies on an equivocation with regards to the two senses of the 
term bare life” (2007 211). 
All of these critiques, however, miss the underlying methodolo-
gical function of the paradigmatic cases that Agamben uses in his 
analysis of bare life. No doubt, Agamben uses both zoē and the homo 
sacer (and even more figures) to refer to bare life. For instance, in his 
analysis of the refugee he refers frequently to bare natural life and to 
zoē (cf . 1998 126) and yet, in his approach to the camp the introduces 
another figure, the Muselmann, in whom nothing natural or com-
mon is “left in him, nothing animal or instinctual remains in his life” 
(id . 185); in other words, the life of the Muselmann is not pure zoē. It 
could be argued, however, that this is not a contradiction in terms, 
since zoē, homo sacer and the Mulselmann as paradigms are deacti-
vated from their normal use, “not in order to be moved into another 
context, but on the contrary, to present the canon –the rule– of that 
use, which cannot be shown in any other way” (Agamben 1999 18). In 
short, Agamben’s bare life is never presupposed by the paradigms he 
uses to make it intelligible. 
However, once again, Agamben’s insistence on Schmitt’s decisio-
nism allows a more legalist reading of bare life which is not centered 
on the paradigmatic cases that make it intelligible but rather on the 
underlying logic that produces it: sovereign decisions in the state of 
exception produce automatically this form of life which becomes “in-
distinguishable and finally coincides with the law” (Salzani 2012 4). 
Bare life, Agamben claims in his essay The State of Exception is “a 
product of the machine and not something that preexists it” (2005 
88). Hence, even when the singularity of the homo sacer as a paradigm 
is suspended and sovereignty as impotentiality exceeds the state of 
exception as a merely juridical dispositif, the notion of bare life still 
remains captured in the machine of the sovereign ban and Agamben’s 
acceptance of Schmitt’s decisionism, shaping Agamben’s understand-
ing of the biopolitical.
Biopolitics therefore, becomes the way in which life is caught in 
the sovereign ban, that is to say, a purely thanatopolitical function of 
state power. Indeed, as Connolly writes, Agamben “contends that the 
logic that binds sovereignty, the sacred and, biopolitics together leads 
(inexorably?) to a state in which a supreme power can annihilate a 
whole minority in the name of national unity” (27). 
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Moreover, given that the sovereign exception functions for 
Agamben in the same way as the Aristotelian im-potentiality, that is 
to say, maintaining itself in the form of its suspension (cf . 1998 47), 
Agamben claims that the state of exception becomes the rule and the 
concentration camp is revealed as the “hidden paradigm of the poli-
tical modernity” (id . 123). Agamben, however, is not referring to the 
camp as a concrete historical place, but rather as an “event that repeats 
itself on a daily basis” (Panagia 1999 3). To say then that the camp is 
the structure that corresponds to the nomos, is to make the claim that 
modernity is the threshold of indistinction between the exception and 
the rule, the biopolitical age par excellence where sovereignty sub- 
sumed the whole biopolitical production rendering biopolitics to a 
sort of thanatopolitics (Fitzpatrick 2001). This reflects the general con-
clusion of this inquiry: the juridical exception cannot be the origin of 
politics and its purpose. A double movement is therefore necessary: to 
rethink the decentering of sovereignty as a juridical decision on the 
exception not via the dramatization of the paradox of sovereignty but 
on the contrary via its de-ontologisation. And secondly, to construct 
another figure as a new paradigm of bare life (i .e . the overcomatose) to 
illustrate the production of forms of life deprived of value in a terrain 
in which the juridical-institutional features of the state of exception 
do not play a central role.
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